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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction

is

conferred

upon

the

appellate

court

pursuant to section 78~2a-3, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
There are three basic issues presented to this court for
review.

Each issue has a number of sub-issues related and con-

tributing to the main issue involved.
1.

What is the appropriate standard for determining visitation

when the custodial party relocates out of the State of Utah with
the minor children of the parties.

Should the court continue to

use the actual extended visitation which occurred prior to the
move, which was limited by the custodial parent, as a controlling
basis or rationale for the visitation awarded after the move?
How does one reconcile the differences between the recommendation
of the Domestic Relation Commissioner, who has great expertise in
this area, and the order of the court which was based upon the
history of visitation prior to the relocation out-of-state.

Is

it in the best interests of the children who are caught up in
interstate visitation to split the visitation based on age,
which in this case requires that one child be sent home to the
custodial parent while the other remains to exercise his full

4

visitation?
2.

The second issue involves all aspects of the interpretation

and implementation of an order for reimbursement of work-related
day care expenses under §78-45-7.16 and 78-45-7.17, Utah Code
Annot. (1953, as amended).

Does the statute contemplate requir-

ing payment of one-half of the day-care expenses without a requirement of an itemization or accounting of the expenses claimed
and without verification that the recipient was actually employed
and not on vacation or engaged in some other activity?

Does this

statute contemplate the full cost of a day-care provider who
provides laundry, cleaning, cooking and other household services
in the custodial parent's home?

Does it require reimbursement

for both the day-care provider and concurrent private preschool
or school, even though public school is available, where the
children are in school, not with the day-care provider, for a
good portion of the day?
3.

Should the court consider a second employment in setting the

amounts to be paid, without any historic basis for that second
income?
4.

May findings contain matters which were not found by the

court pursuant to a review of the transcript and entered over the
objection of the other party.

The standard of review for this

issue is that of "clearly erroneous".
156 (Utah App. 1989).
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Maughn v. Maughn 770 P. 2d

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
AND RULES
The following are the citations for the provisions which
Defendant believes may be determinative of the issues presented.
Each provision, statute or rule is set forth in its entirety in
section "C" of the attached addendum.
A.

Statutes:

Sections 30-3-5; 78-45-7.5; 78-45-7.16;

78-45-7.17; and, 78-45-7.18, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).
B.

Rules:

Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

C.

Defendant is not aware at this time of any constitu-

tional provisions, ordinances or Utah cases which are dispositive
on the issues raised herein.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case:
Defendant filed a petition for modification of a decree of

divorce seeking a change of visitation due to Plaintiff's move to
California with the children of the parties.

Plaintiff counter-

petitioned seeking modification of the amount of day care reimbursement Defendant was required to pay to Plaintiff.
B.

Course of proceedings:
The petition and counterpetitions for modification of the

decree of divorce filed in this matter came on for trial on April

6

2, 1992, after having been before a domestic relations commissioner for a pretrial and after a pretrial before the trial
judge.
C.

Disposition at trial court:
An order modifying the decree of divorce was entered June

30, 1992, in the Third Judicial District Court.

No motions were

made under Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
1992.

The notice of appeal was filed on July 23,

Record at 239.

A copy of the order entered is set forth

in Addendum MA" attached hereto.

RELEVANT FACTS
A decree of divorce was entered by the trial court on August, 22, 1990. Record at 118-129.

Plaintiff was awarded custo-

dy of the two minor children of the parties subject to
Defendant's visitation.

Record at 119-121.

Defendant was awarded the following as his extended visitation: i.) Christmas Day from 6:00 PM through December 26th at
8:00 PM; ii.) Prior to the children entering school, two one-week
blocks in the summer and once the children reach the age of nine,
six weeks in the summer, not to exceed four weeks for one visitation block; iii.)

Upon the children entering school one-half of

the Christmas break and one month in the summer for two two-week
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periods.

Record at 119 - 121.

In addition to the extended

visitation, Defendant was granted reasonable visitation defined
as: Alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 PM to Sunday at 6:00
PM; Alternate holidays; One evening on the off week from 5:30 PM
to 8:30 PM; Father's day; and, the afternoon and evening of each
child's birthday or one day in the week of that birthday.
Defendant fully exercised his rights of visitation.
script, at 50.

Id.
Tran-

He had the children with him as often as he

could, and Plaintiff had him care for the children at additional
times.

Transcript, at 51, and 57.

At the end of August, 1991, Plaintiff moved to California
with the minor children and her new husband.
and Record at 145.

Transcript, at 27

Her sole reason for the move was to allow her

husband to attend school.

Transcript, at 28.

Record at 157-158.

Prior to this relocation, Plaintiff gave to Defendant notice
of her intentions to move to California.
changes to the visitation failed.
1991,

Discussions to settle

Record at 149.

On August 15,

Defendant filed his petition for modification of the

decree of divorce on the issue of visitation.

Record at 131-136.

Plaintiff was served with process on August 15, 1991.

Record at

157-158.
Plaintiff counterclaimed on the issue of the amount of daycare to be reimbursed to her from Defendant.

Record at 142-151.

Plaintiff alleged that day-care under the statute should include
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paying for private preschool and paying for a full-time day care
provider who would be present in the home while the minor children were in school.

Record at 193-195, 208-209.

Transcript at

38.
The claims came on for a pretrial

settlement hearing on

October 28, 1991, before Commissioner Arnett.
He recommended

Record at 174-175.

the Defendant be granted one-half of the school

summer vacation.

Id.

These recommendations were accepted by De-

fendant, but rejected by Plaintiff.

Transcript, at 3 and 24.

The case went to trial on April 2, 1992.

Record at 207.

The court received and utilized information of Defendant's second
employment, a fledgling solo legal practice, without historical
review of Defendant's actual

income, determined based thereon

that Defendant was capable of paying more, and based the award of
day-care thereon.

Transcript, at 13 and 78.

The court found it

reasonable that Defendant reimburse total day-care expenses which
included housekeeping services in Plaintiff's home, i.e., including doing the children's laundry, cleaning the children's rooms,
preparing the children's meals and cleaning up after them, staying in the home while the children were in school and being on
call; and that the day-care reimbursement should be at a flat
rate without any proof as to utilization of the day care in a
work-related manner.

Transcript, at 7 7 - 7 9 .
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Further, the court

found that Plaintiff may continue the five year old child in
private preschool or private school, with one-half of the expense
of both school and a full-time day care provider being charged to
Defendant as work related day-care while the day-care provider
remains alone at the Plaintiff's home during school hours.
Transcript at 8 0 - 8 2 .

The costs of private school were to be

charged to Defendant on an order to show cause without a full
hearing on any allegations raised by Plaintiff in support of her
position.

Transcript, at 81 - 82.

The result of this is the

shifting of the burden of proof onto the Defendant to rebut the
schooling.

The judge indicated that it was her personal opinion

that it is reasonable to split the children up for visitation
purposes during the two years while the transition from age seven
to age nine occurs for the younger child, despite both parties
indicating that the children should be treated equally.

Tran-

script, at 52 and 73.
The findings presented by Plaintiff and signed by the court
contained a number of additional matters which were not found by
the court as a review of the transcript shows.
213.

Record at 211 -

These findings and the order based there on were entered

over the objection of Defendant.

Record at 216 -217.

appeal was filed on those findings and order.
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This

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court, in limiting extended visitation, abused

its discretion in light of the standardized visitation schedule
in effect and the nature of the changed circumstances.

It is an

abuse of discretion to require siblings to be split up for any
portion of the extended visitation.
In arriving at its findings, the trial court erred in hearing or considering any actual extended visitation which occurred
prior to the change in circumstance, as the parties had been
divorce for only one year prior to the change and as Plaintiff,
the custodial parent, controlled any other visitation than that
which was ordered prior to the change.
II.

The trial court committed reversible error in its award of

day care and in the findings supportive of that award.
A.

The provisions of 78-45-7.16 and -7.17, Utah Code

Annot. (1953, as amended) should control any order of day care
reimbursement.

It was an abuse of the court's powers to set a

flat fee without the requirement of documentation contemplated by
those statutes particularly in light of the facts that the day
care provider is performing service to Plaintiff other than day
care and that the children are absent for significant periods of
time during the day.
B.

"Reasonable day care" (emphasis added) requires that

11

the court consider all factors including the necessity of the
expense of private school; it was error for the court to award
the amount of day care which it did,

It was further error to

speculate regarding future secondary income in that award without
a proven history of that secondary income,
C.

The Plaintiff should

be required

to substantiate the

use of the day care provider for work-related purposes in order
to obtain reimbursement from Defendant to alleviate abuses which
have occurred in the past and to insure that the expenses truly
are work-related.
III. It is clearly erroneous for a trial court to sign and enter
findings of fact which do not comport with the oral pronouncement
of its finding as reflected by the transcript particularly when
an objection is filed addressing those errors.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING LIMITED

VISITATION, IN SPLITTING UP THE CHILDREN FOR VISITATION AND IN
USING THE VISITATION WHICH ACTUALLY OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES AS THE BASIS FOR THE AWARD UNDER THE MODIFICATION.
The trial court retains jurisdiction over this matter and
has the power to modify a decree of divorce upon a showing of a
substantial change in circumstances.
619, 621 (Utah App. 1991).

Walton v. Walton,

814 P. 2d

See also, Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P. 2d

156, 159 (Utah App. 1989) and § 30-3-5, Utah Code Annot. (1953,
as amended).

This is true even though Plaintiff, during the

proceedings below, relocated to California with the minor children of the parties.

Curtis

v. Curtis,

789 P. 2d 717, 722-725

(Utah App. 1990).
Defendant has located no Utah cases directly on point on the
issue of modification of visitation orders based upon relocation
of the parties.

Therefore Defendant is unable to cite the exact

standard of review for this court.

The above cited Utah cases

involve custody issues and are concerned with the "ping-pong"
effect that changes of custody can create.
2d at 159-161.

See, Maughn, 770 P.

The standard applied there was the abuse of

discretion or manifest injustice.

Id.

As the need to protect

the children from the "ping-pong" effect and the attendant need
13

to protect the children

is not present

in this case, a lower

standard of review of the trial court would be appropriate.
There has been a material
case.

change of circumstances

in this

Plaintiff, who has custody of the minor children of the

parties, moved to California with those children.

This was done

solely to allow Plaintiff's new husband to attend school, and not
for any reason beneficial to Plaintiff or the minor children.
The net effect is a substantial decrease in the amount of visitation which Defendant could have with the children, thereby depriving him of meaningful contact with the children.
Creech

v. Creech,

367 So. 2d 1244 (La. App., 1979) deals

directly with modifying a divorce decree on the issue of visitation due to the noncustodial
to Mexico.

parent's relocation from Louisiana

The virtual inability to exercise the decreed visita-

tion was recognized and the court found
stantially change the visitation award.

it appropriate to subCreech 367 So. 2d

at

1246.
In Creech,

the father, the noncustodial

parent, was origi-

nally granted visitation rights of one weekend per month, the
last week in December and two weeks in the summer.

Id.

This

comes out to about forty-five days of visitation a year.
The trial court in that case found that "the best interest
of the children would be served and fairness would prevail upon
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the part of all parties if a summer visitation period was increased from two weeks to five weeks ... .'

By enabling meaning-

ful visitation with their father, this arrangement could be more
beneficial to the children."

Id.

This finding was affirmed by
Id.

the Louisiana court of appeals.

finding was that the father ended
visitation a year.

The net effect of this

up with forty-two days of

He only lost three days of visitation per

year.
In the instant case, Defendant was previously awarded reasonable visitation which amounted to eighty-seven days per year.
Under the order being appealed, Defendant has thirty-five days of
visitation per year.

Under that order, visitation will, in three

years, increase to forty-nine days of visitation.

This is a

truly significant decrease.
Plaintiff was questioned about concerns other than those
arising from the reasons for the divorce.

Transcript at 54, and

57 - 58. She did not provide any other concerns.

In fact she

admitted at that point that the parties did not have blocks of
time in which Defendant could visit with the children the summer
before the move to California.

Transcript at 57.

She stated,

that Defendant was limited to the time Plaintiff would
before that move.

allow

Id.

Defendant asserts that the doctrine of res judicata

applies

in this matter and that all of the alleged problems and concerns
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raised by Plaintiff concerning conduct prior to the entry of the
decree of divorce have been adjudicated.

We do not have the

concerns raised in Maughn concerning the basis of the initial
Maughn 770 P. 2d at 160.

determination.

Therefore all of the

Plaintiff's worries and concerns about the conduct of the Defendant prior to the entry of divorce decree were improperly before
the court.

Those concerns did not prevent Plaintiff from stipu-

lating to the visitation described above at the time divorce case
was entered.

Yet within just days over a year after the decree

of divorce was entered, Plaintiff moved to California and asserts
that Defendant's visitation should be reduced for the same reasons.

Transcript at 58.
In deciding the visitation issue, the court mentioned con-

cern about the ages of the children
script at 7 1 - 7 1 .
of the hearing.

a number of times.

Tran-

The children were five and seven at the time

Transcript at 71.

The standardized visitation

schedule in effect at the time of the trial specified a four week
block of time for visitation for in-state parties.

(No stand-

ardized visitation schedule was in effect at the time of the
original divorce.)

The four week extended standardized visita-

tion begins upon the children entering school.

The denial of

more than two weeks at any time grants less time that the instate standardized

visitation

schedule.
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Further, the domestic

relations commissioner recommended that Plaintiff be granted onehalf of the school summer vacation.
In re Marriage

of Susan Hatzievgenakis

and Vassilis

Hatziev-

genakis, 434 NW 2d 914 (Iowa App, 1988), provides illumination on
this issue.

That case involved a divorce rather than modifica-

tion of a decree.

The father was a citizen of Greece while the

mother was a U. S. citizen.
citizenship.

The child of the parties held a dual

In re Hatzievgenakis,

434 NW 2d at 915.

The father

maintain a Greek residence and was a Staff Captain on a Greek
cruise ship.

In re Hatzievgenakis,

434 NW 2d at 914 - 915.

The mother raise numerous concerns about the father removing
the child from the United States, about how various aspects of
Greek society and culture may affect the child, and about the
father failing to return the child.
2d at 916 - 917.

In re Hatzievgenakis,

434 NW

The court of appeals allowed extended visita-

tion outside of the United State and the child was only six years
of age at the time.

In re Hatzievgenakis,

434 NW 2d at 915 and

917.
Greece is certainly much farther from Iowa than California
is from Utah.

Concerns about enforcement of the decree of di-

vorce do not exist, particularly as the Defendant in this matter
is a resident of Utah.

Hence if a child of six can travel abroad

for extended visitation, children of six can travel one hour by
air to Utah for extended visitation.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF DAY CARE AND IN ITS

FINDINGS SUPPORTING THAT AWARD.
A.

THE PROVISIONS OF §78-45-7.16 AND -7.17, UTAH CODE

ANNOT. (1989, AS AMENDED) CONTROL THE AWARD OF DAY CARE REIMBURSEMENT, IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SET A FLAT FEE
WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT OF DOCUMENTATION PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF
THE FACT THAT THE DAY CARE PROVIDER IS PERFORMING ACTIVITIES
OTHER THAN DAY CARE AND THAT THE CHILDREN ARE NOT WITH THAT DAY
CARE PROVIDER FOR A SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME DURING THE DAY.
The standard to be applied to this entire issue is in question.

No Utah cases have been located on the narrow issue of a

modification of a day care award.

Plaintiff suggests that

§78-45-7.16 and -7.17, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended),
clearly controls and if a standard is required, the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review should be utilized.
These statutes concern "reasonable work-related day care
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of
the parents...".

§78-45-7.16(1) Utah Code Annot. (1953, as

amended). See also,

§78-45-7.17 (1), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as

amended).

It is further stated that if the amount ceases to be

incurred, payment may be suspended without modifying the prior
order of the court.

§78-45-7.16(2) Utah Code Annot. (1953, as

18

amended).
Plaintiff asserted at trial that an in-home day care provider was required

for the entire day despite the fact that the

minor children were in school for a good portion of the day while
Plaintiff was at work.
The statute states that the costs in question be actually
incurred on behalf of the children.
Annot. (1953, as amended).

78-45-7.16 (1) Utah Code

The children are deriving no benefit

from the day care provider if they are not with that person, as
when they are in school.

Hence it is violative of the statue to

require Defendant to pay for one-half of the costs of a day care
provider to simply sit in Plaintiff's home while the children are
away from the home.
Plaintiff alleged the need for a contact person for the
school in the event of illness or problem with a child as justification for the day care provider sitting at home while the
children are in school.

Plaintiff is remarried and has asserted

that her new husband be treated as an appropriate provider for
the children.
at 146 and

See, Plaintiff's counterclaim at 1NT2d, 3g.

148 respectively.

Record

This means that Plaintiff

has

herself and her new husband as contact people with the children's
school in the event of a problem.
leave employment

The possibility of having to

due to a problem with a child at school

19

is

simply part of being a parent whether divorced or not.
Until

the children

are essentially

emancipated

there

is

always a potential need for someone to be "on call" should problems arise at school.

At what age does this day care obligation

terminate?
Day care under Utah's statutes appears to consist of taking
care of the children themselves.
children enter school

It should be reduced as the

and eventually

get older, and so the trial

terminate as the children

court found.

Transcript

at 78.

Therefore to be ordered to pay for "on call" goes well beyond the
scope of these statues and contrary to the court's own findings.
Furthermore, while in California, and until just prior to trial,
Plaintiff utilized a day care provider just after school, Transcript at 45.

She did not historically have someone "on call".

Plaintiff also admitted that the day care provider performed
various household chores and that Plaintiff pays her no more for
those duties.

Transcript at 39-40.

When the children are home,

the day care provider, while performing these chores, is again
unavailable to give the children her attention and attend to
them.

When the children are not at home, the day care provider

is, in essence, a house keeper for Plaintiff or caring for another child of Plaintiff's who is not part of this action.
The court, in addition to allowing the "on call" nature of
this matter also found that it was reasonable to require Defend-
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ant to pay for one-half of private preschool for one of the
children and that the cost of the private preschool, $655 per
month, was reasonable.

Transcript at 75 and 78.

Not only is

Defendant required to pay one-half of the expenses for an "on
call" person but also one-half of the private schooling for the
one child, all purportedly as day care.

This has the effect of

requiring Defendant to pay twice for day care.
B.

THE DAY CARE EXPENSES MUST BE REASONABLE.

IT WAS AN

ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO AWARD AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF REASONABLE
DAY CARE AND TO CONSIDER ANY SECONDARY INCOME IN THAT AWARD
The statutes state reasonable day care costs.

Defendant

asserts that the costs incurred by Plaintiff are not reasonable.
In addition to the above arguments, it must be remembered
that Plaintiff did not move to California to advance her career,
employment, or to benefit the minor children.

She moved solely

because her new husband desired to attend school there.

Tran-

script at 28.
In fact, Plaintiff testified that she actually did incur a
slight decrease in her personal income as a result of this move,
though her family income had increased.

Plaintiff also knew that

the cost of living would be higher as a result of her choice to
please her new husband.

Plaintiff's joint income at the time of

21

trial was substantial
at

12, 26, and

in comparison to Defendant's.

48, and

Record

at

169 - 175.

Transcript
This

raised

Plaintiff's standard of living to a level at which a housekeeper
might be appropriate, but it is not appropriate to Defendant in
his circumstances.
While Plaintiff was married to Defendant, there was an inhome day care provider for a period of that time.

Plaintiff

testified at trial that while in Utah the cost of this in-home
day care provider averaged around $500 to $600 per month. At that
time both of the children were preschool age. As a result of this
voluntary move Plaintiff has almost doubled the cost of day care
and seeks to have Defendant

pay one-half of that

doubling.

Defendant's share of the cost of the Utah day care provider was
reduced in the original decree because that provider was also
performing household duties.
The court required, and considered, evidence of a second
income by Defendant despite objection.

Transcript at 13 - 14.

While there is no guideline in determining income for day care,
§78-45-7.5 (2), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), does indicate a limitation of income being equivalent to one full-time
job.

That action was error on the part of the trial

particularly

as there had

been no history

i ncome.
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of that

court,

secondary

C.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE USE OF

THE DAY CARE PROVIDER FOR WORK-RELATED PURPOSES IN ORDER TO
OBTAIN REIMBURSEMENT.
The flat nature of the order of the trial court opens the
order to abuse in favor of the Plaintiff and to the detriment of
the Defendant.

The statutes contemplate an accounting through

the use of the words "actually incurred"

and the ability to

terminate payments without the need for a modification if payments are not incurred.
The flat payment as ordered allows Plaintiff to take vacations, trips, or even be unemployed or on sick or disability
leave without notice to Defendant.
at 253 - 254 and 256 - 257.

See transcript at 28. Record

Defendant would then make his con-

tribution and without knowing it be paying for day care which is
not work-related, if it was incurred at all.

In fact, as the

order is worded, one could interpret that wording so as to require that Defendant make the day care payment even when the
children are with him in Utah.

Record at 259-261.

This would

mean a wind fall to Plaintiff as she may not actually be incurring these expenses.
The record of the case below shows that such abuses have
occurred.

Record at 253 - 254, 256 - 257, and 259 - 261. Plain-

tiff attempted to charge Defendant for day care expenses while
she was on her honeymoon with her new husband.
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Transcript at 22

and 24.

The statute clearly states that if "the actual

expense ... ceases to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making
monthly payment of that expense...".

78-45-7.16(2).

In order to

do that, Defendant has a right to know when such expenses are not
actual 1y incurred.
Finally on this issue, the court erred in allowing Plaintiff
to bring an action to require ongoing private school for the
younger child, despite public school being available, by way of
an order to show cause.

The order to show cause, by its very

nature shifts the burden of proof upon the Defendant, who would
have no knowledge of the problems of the minor child involved nor
would Defendant have any ability to develop the proof, such as
expert or medical testimony, to refute the allegations.

Plain-

tiff, being the proponent of the request and being the one with
access to the needs and concerns of that child should be the
burden of proving the need.

To hold otherwise places the Defend-

ant in a totally untenable position.
Is private school reasonable?

There is no evidence in the

record that the younger child is disabled or dysfunction, nor is
he.

III.

Under these circumstances, private school is not reasonable.

IT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SIGN

AND ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AFTER AN ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT OF ITS
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FINDINGS WHICH CONTAIN PROVISIONS WHICH WERE NOT ENUNCIATED BY
THE COURT AT THE TIME IT ANNOUNCED ITS FINDINGS AND WHICH WERE
PROPERLY OBJECTED TO BY A PARTY.
The trial court made oral findings of fact at the time of
trial, pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Counsel for the Plaintiff prepared written findings, supposedly
based upon the oral announcements of the court and submitted them
to the court for signature.
Those findings contained a number of additional paragraphs
and items which were not included in the oral findings of the
court as reflected by the transcript of those pronouncements.
Defendant made a timely objection to those inappropriate conclusions and the findings were signed and entered over those objections.
Maughn.

That was clearly erroneous and should be reversed.

See,

Further, this court is not limited to the written find-

ings and may properly examine those findings expressed from the
Merriam

bench by way of the transcript.
1172 (Utah App. 1990).
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v. Merriam,

799 P. 2d

CONCLUSION
Defendant should

be awarded extended

visitation

as recom-

mended by Commissioner Arnett, to wit, one-half of the school
summer vacation.

This visitation should

begin

immediately

and

there should be no splitting of the children during these periods
of visitation.

Such an order would best serve the purpose of

fostering the children's relationship with their father.
The order of day care as set forth by the trial court is
erroneous and should be set aside.

Plaintiff should have to

abide by the statute in providing proof of actually
work-related day care expenses.

incurred

This is required so as to pro-

tect Defendant from continued abuses of the day care charges and
potential
ment.

wind fall

profits to Plaintiff to Defendant's detri-

The day care should be limited to services provided to the

children and not for housekeeping, "on call" or other non-child
care activities.

Further, the trial court should not be allowed

to consider income, other than that equivalent to one full-time
employment,

in determining day care awards without a properly

developed history of that secondary income.
The written findings of fact submitted by the Plaintiff and
signed entered by the trial judge must be amended to conform to
the oral findings set forth by the trial judge as reflected by
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the transcript of the proceedings.
^ t-4-oH this
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1992
w

KATHRYN S. DENHOLM, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant / Appellant
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG),
ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 894900194
DAVID HARTWIG,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendant.
-oOo
Both parties' Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable
Anne M. Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney,
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in
chambers

and

having

resolved

certain

visitation

issues

and

submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and
the Court having made and entered its written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law herein,

NOW,

THEREFORE,

IT IS H E R E B Y

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

> I*«'»« FFHI <is

AMI

n
The Defendan*

odified as follows:

\lternate school breaks, m , .« exceed
in*

.L'-hal^oi i m
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^eluded

Christmas

Defendant's v si-a

. . period
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further

provision that tJ «.- children
i- .

-1,i istiik,r:. P v e o r C h r i s t m a s
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i

efendant

b o t h of t h e c h i l d r e n f o r t -

*

.

b i n Ls
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i

throughout
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!l
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one-half of

: :

; v..

1 ( l;I) i)(H' I Oik!
Defendant sha
and

thereafter

i

Ma2

r uqu i L t1 • I -' i sun
D.

.•

. *-*

.

* -

Commencing

visitation

for

t w»i

visits

ummer
tliree-week

periods,

and

this

uiiui each child reaches the

age r* rune.

As eacn

; * -i ^ u m s

.t

*

n biidxx increase _. s; < weeks, with two blocks
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of time and with no block of time being longer than one
month.
E.

One long weekend not to exceed six days only

during the time the children would not be in school, upon
reasonable

notice.

Defendant

shall

pay

for

the

transportation costs for the visit.
F.

Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the

parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof.
G.

Reasonable visitation in the home state of the

children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to
and from any previously planned activities.
H.

The parties shall split the transportation

costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare
possible, with the parties exchanging the information
necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain
the cheapest fare.
I.

Defendant

shall

drop

the

children

off to

Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative.
2.
per

month

Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75
for

day

care, until

the Montessori

education

is

concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April,
1992.

When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that
3

wi 1 1 be reduced down ]»,,' o n e - h a l f
pei

of

the t > l a l

IIP »iit f i f lii V * »' "> ^f* ptjr month tin

day c a r e .

3.

"Mitiui

Each p a r t y s h a l l pay t In 11 nwn a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s

' f

$?65.00

incurred

herein.
i

L

^C

day of

" ^>^—^-^—^

, 1992.

BY Tiff ^OURT:

ANNE M. STIRBA
District Court Imlqe

„.

Approved a s In h i ni

;.,V

KATHRYN S. DENHOLM
Attorney for Defendant

i

<-fcD IN CLERK b urj-i^u
Salt Lake County Utah

JUN 2 9 1992
-<?.4

SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG),
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 894900194
DAVID HARTWIG,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendant,
-0O0-

Both parties* Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable
Anne M. Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney,
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in
chambers

and

having

resolved

certain

visitation

issues

and

submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, does
now make, adopt and find the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
i

in- 'purl, imris that «\ii

Decree of Divorce was entered
irU'V.nit Darl

i about August ?.?, 1990,
, which provided,

.is follows:

Custody/Visitation.
rlaintiff was awarded the
permanent care, custody and control of the parties' two
minor children, Benjamin James Hartwig, age 5, born on
October 17, 1984, and Nathan Meade Hartwig, age
on January 19, 1987, subject to specified rights
visitation on behalf of Defendant as follows:
A.
Alternate weekends, from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to
Sunday -v 6 ; 0 0 p.m.
B.
Alternate
holidays, with
the
following
holidays: New Years Day; Martin Luther King Jr. Day;
President's Day; Easter; Memorial Day; Independence Day;
Pioneer Day; Labor Day; Columbus Day; Halloween;
Veterans' Day; and Thanksgiving Day.
C.
'
8:30 p.m.

vening on the off week from 5:30 p.m. *"~

D.
Christmas ba_y iiw*n 6:00 p. in, through December
26th at 8:00 p.m.
E.
Prior to the children entering school, two oneweek blocks in the summer, with notification by June 15th
for 1990 and thereafter by May 1st of each year. Once
the children reach the age of nine, Defendant shall be
entitled to have the chi ldren for six weeks in the
summei (l not to exceed four weeks: for one visitation
block.
F.
Upon the children entering school, one-half of
the Christmas break and one month in the summer for two
two-week periods of time. In the event that the children
are in year-round school, Defendant shall be entitled to
one-half of all breaks, with no block to exceed two weeks
at a time and not to exceed one month total on an annual
basis prior to the children reaching nine years of age,
or to exceed six weeks total on an annual basis after the
children reach the age of nine, not to exceed four weeks
for one visitation block.
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G.
Each Father's Day, regardless of whose weekend
upon which this holiday may fall.
H.
Each Mother's Day will be with the Plaintiff,
regardless whose weekend upon which this holiday may
fall.
I.
The afternoon and evening of each child's
birthday, or one day in the same week as that child's
birthday as determined by the child.
J.
If Defendant works every weekend as his primary
job and primary source of income, he shall be entitled to
one overnight visitation per week on a consistent night
to be agreed between the parties.
At such time as
Defendant no longer works every weekend as his primary
job and primary source of income, the other visitation
provisions provided herein, i.e., alternate weekends, one
evening on the off week, etc., should be implemented.
K.
The parties shall have equal access to medical,
school records and other important records for the
children. Plaintiff shall sign any releases that are
necessary to allow the children's school to provide
Defendant with a schedule of all the upcoming school
activities.
In the event any significant school or
social events occur that are not on the schedule,
Plaintiff shall provide Defendant reasonable notice in
advance of those activities. Defendant shall be notified
of non-routine medical treatment and shall have access to
the children's medical files.
L.
Each party shall keep the other advised of
their current address and telephone numbers, as well as
that same information concerning the children's regular
care givers. Neither party shall move their residence
outside Salt Lake County without thirty (30) days prior
written notice to the other party.
Child Support. Defendant was ordered to pay a base
amount of child support in the amount of $140.50 per
month, per child, for a total of $281.00 per month. In
addition, Defendant was ordered to pay up to $250.00 per
month for his one-half portion of the reasonable workrelated day care, and there was a cap of $250.00 for the
day care expenses, for a total monthly support of
$531.00, after giving^ Defendant a credit for medical
insurance premiums of $50.00 per month for the children.
Said support was to be paid through the Clerk of the
3

Court, one-half on the 5th and 20th days of each month,
until the children reach the age of eighteen and graduate
from high school in their expected senior year,
2. • Since
:umstances

the

entry

¥

ihe

Decree

,

i

parties have materially and substantially

changed, inc.

,

• A.

nf

m i ml

Plaintiff

i n the following:

has reman ied and at l.hu .-. • <l of

moved t o I, lie State of California with her
unl I In1 i "li i I ih IMI

- husband

starting Theology Schoc,

wli* "i »» li"! new husband is

Plaintiff's employment

a

Ml iat u of U'taa wab cii^w *** Llie process of being phased
out.
li,

After'

tlic
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period
earning a gross

•*

.*

.n is
*\ * :

•' 1 * |i^ i u i • i t i c. t" l,111 V.Ji

substantial]

day c a r e

was

employed,

income of

l e s s t h a n w h a t she? w a s earning

The

Plaintiff

r

i --

the entry
\

expenses

fM-r month
lM,'n 1I,I ,

increased and have gone from approximately
includes Montessori

au i d,i

prescho

, & axsv

*

higher

expenses
, ilifornia, with Plaintifx -»

mortgage payment.

m

LUX. a vc i>r

modest home.
'•••'^diii
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ud$

remarried

s i n c e t h e e n t r y cm
4

mm

IU>I

and
net

his

income

11 fi Hi vim it

has
-MI

the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, his
income was $1,988,00,

His present income is $2,370.00

per month, and pursuant to Defendant's testimony, he also
earned approximately $5,000.00 in 1991 from his private
law practice, after business expenses.
3.

The Court

finds that the parties have had ongoing

problems with visitation, but the parties have stipulated to the
following visitation:
A.

Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-

month block.
B.

One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas

Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further
provision that the children not be required to travel on
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day.
C.

In the summer of 1992, Defendant should have

both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff
should pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph
3(G) below.
Defendant should notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992,
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times
requires for summer visitation.
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D.

{

One long weekend n o t t o exceed
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1992, there may be two two-week periods for both of these children
and that it seems to be in the best interests of the children and
reasonable in light of the stipulation of the parties.
With

regard

to

subsequent

years, the

Court

finds that

visitation must be set in recognition of the rights of the natural
parents and what is in the best interests of the children.

In

making such orders, the Court considers the age of the children,
the relationship of the children to the non-custodial parent, the
stability of the home environment of the non-custodial parent and
other issues that pertain to what is in the best interests of the
children regarding visitation.

In the Court's view, age is a

significant factor, and the ages of the children, Nathan having
just turned five in January, 1992, and Ben being seven years old at
this time.
The Court finds that it is reasonable to change visitation
during

the

summer

months

gradually,

rather

than

making

a

significant change from two two-week periods to all of a sudden a
volume of a six week period of time, from the four-week period of
block of time, or even as Defendant has requested, even six weeks
at a time. After hearing all of the testimony in this matter, the
Court does not believe that it is in the best interests of these
children, given their ages and given the fact that they have not
had the opportunity to have visitation with their father for more
than one week to ten days at a time to date.
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Defendant testified that one of the reasons he wanted a larger
block of time for visitation was due to his work schedule, and he
also felt that it would benefit the children to be able to spend a
larger block of time with him and that he would attempt to arrange
his work schedule.

The Court finds, however, that if because of

his work schedule there were other problems and he were not able to
fulfill the four-week arrangement, that he would then return the
children to the natural mother. The Court has some concerns about
that arrangement in and of itself, because even if Defendant would
be able to make those kinds of changes, once the children have it
in their minds and expectation of a certain period, then obviously
the Court finds it is in the best interests to fulfill that
expectation so long as there aren't other problems that would
outweigh that in any particular circumstance.
Defendant has proposed larger blocks of time because he wants
to be able to do things with the children, such as take off work
and do things with them and he felt that longer blocks of time
would be valuable in and of themselves.
that issue, as well.

The Court has considered

The Court has also heard evidence from the

Plaintiff concerning Defendant's marital situation and the problems
he experienced in the marriage and arguments that have ensued
between Defendant and his current wife in front of the children in
the summer of 1992. This was not disputed by Defendant.
In light of the ages of the children and their best interests,
the Court specifically finds that after 1992, the summer visitation
8
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should occur in a gradual fashion and increase in length of time,
until they reach the age of nine. The Court finds that Plaintiff's
proposal is reasonable in this matter, and the Court finds that
there should be two three-week periods in 1993, and that visitation
should continue until each child reaches the age of nine.
Court

The

finds that as each child turns the age of nine, the

visitation should increase to six weeks, with two blocks of time
and with no block of time being longer than one month.

The Court

specifically recommends that there will be a period of time when
the older child will be staying longer and the younger child would
come home.

The Court finds, however, that a nine year old can

better handle a longer period of visitation than a seven year old
could under the same circumstances.

The Court finds that it is

important for the parties to encourage communication with the
children.
5.

With regard

to the day care

issue, the Court has

considered the testimony that has been presented and arguments of
counsel with regard to this particular issue. The Court finds that
Defendant has been paying $250.00 per month, which is less than
one-half of the actual day care costs incurred by Plaintiff when
she resided in Utah.

That was the amount that the parties agreed

to at the time of the divorce.

Plaintiff's day care expenses now

amount to $1,017.15 per month, with $265.00 going towards payment
of the Montessori Preschool/day care tuition.

The Court believes

that is a reasonable amount for Montessori tuition.
9

The Court is

aware that when Nathan enters kindergarten that the Montessori
school

amount

should

disappear

because

when

he

goes

to

kindergarten, presumably at a public school, that tuition amount
will no longer apply.

It is not clear, based upon the testimony,

as to when Nathan will go to kindergarten, but when he does, that
expense should no longer exist.
The Court finds that if the preschool expense for Montessori
continues after Nathan enters kindergarten, that issue should be
reserved by this Court, with Plaintiff to present justification at
that time if she feels it appropriate for him to continue to go to
a Montessori program and require Defendant to pay one-half of the
costs thereof, which may be done by way of Order to Show Cause.
With regard to the other child care expense, that amount is
$752.50 according to Plaintiff's testimony.

First of all, with

regard to Plaintiff's mother-in-law who resides with the parties in
California, the Court is not persuaded that expenses of child care
represented

in

Plaintiff's

figures

covers

Plaintiff's mother-in-law, who is elderly

any

expenses

for

(age 83), but self-

sufficient. There is no credible evidence otherwise, and the Court
finds that that amount does not pertain to the care, and whatever
care is attributable in the family, not to the mother-in-law.
Second of all, with regard to whether the mother-in-law could
step up and be a child care provider, the Court finds that the
custodial parent has to have discretion in determining who is to
care for the children. Obviously, part or some of the functions of
10
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this child care provider goes to things that the mother-in-law is
not able to provide, specifically, transporting the children to and
from Spanish lessons, karate lessons, baseball games, try-out
practices and that sort of thing, and there may be others.

Some

discussion has to be given to the child care so that it is apparent
who is best able to provide appropriate chid care.

In this

particular circumstance, the Court is satisfied that there has not
been an unreasonable decision in not choosing the mother-in-law to
care for the children, but that that person could look to outside
care.
The Court finds that $752.50 per month is a reasonable amount
of expense to pay on a monthly basis for in-home child care,
especially in light of the duties that were testified to in Court,
namely,

getting

the children ready

for school; getting them

breakfast; taking the children to school; bringing the children
home from school; providing lunch for the child that comes home
midday; taking the children to these various activities; and
attending to their laundry. The Court is aware of what laundry the
children could generate, and household disarray that they could
create, taking care of the home insofar as it relates to the child
care. There is no credible evidence otherwise in this Court's view
that the day care expense was in part attributable to other
household duties.

All of the evidence that has been presented to

the Court really indicates- that the child care provider is, in
fact, providing child care and not providing other household
11

duties. Therefore, The Court finds that the child care expense of
$752.50 per month is reasonable and also necessary to provide child
care.

The Court finds that that covers everything with regard to

the child care expense.
Accordingly, the testimony of Defendant was that it would be
difficult for him to come up with the extra money, but the Court is
satisfied that there is an ability to pay, to contribute the
additional amounts towards child care expense.

The Court finds

that $1,117.50 is a reasonable amount of total monthly child care
under the circumstances and for the reasons indicated previously,
and

therefore,

until

the Montessori

education

is concluded,

Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 per
month, for a total of $508.75 per month, which is half of that
amount for day care, to commence with the month of April, 1992.
When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that will be
reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00, or a
reduction to $376.25 per month for day care.
With regard to someone being in the home at times when the
child is not at home, the Court finds that there is not anything
unusual about that particular practice here, given the fact that
that person has to be on call in case a child is sick or that
provides an opportunity of time in which to take care of other
child-related issues at home.

The Court does not think that is

unreasonable under the circumstances.

This again may change when

the children are in school full-time.

The Court finds that there

12

will have to be a re-evaluation of this at that time because
presumably the child care expense would be substantially affected
by having two children in school full-time.

There is no evidence

before the Court on which to rule on that particular issue now.
6.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has had great difficulty

in collecting the work-related day care expenses.
7.

The Court further finds that the parties have agreed that

they should each pay their own attorney's fees incurred herein.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Defendant's visitation shall be modified as follows:
A.

Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-

month block.
B.

One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas

Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further
provision that the children not be required to travel on
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day.
C.

In the summer of 1992, Defendant shall have

both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff
shall pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph
1(G) below.
13
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Defendant shall notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992,
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times
requires for summer visitation.
D.

Commencing in 1993, Defendant shall have summer

visitation

for

two

three-week

periods,

and

this

visitation should continue until each child reaches the
age of nine.

As each child turns the age of nine, the

visitation shall increase to six weeks, with two blocks
of time and with no block of time being longer than one
month.
E.

One long weekend not to exceed six days only

during the time the children would not be in school, upon
reasonable

notice.

Defendant

shall

pay

for

the

transportation costs for the visit.
F.

Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the

parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof.
G.

Reasonable visitation in the home state of the

children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to
and from any previously planned activities.
H.

The parties shall split the transportation

costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare
possible, with the parties exchanging the information
14
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necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain
the cheapest fare.
I.

Defendant

shall

drop

the

children

off to

Plaintiffs husband, babysitter or relative.
2.
per

month

Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75
for

day

care, until

the Montessori

education

is

concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April,
1992.

When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that

will be reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00
per month, to $37 6.25 per month for day care.
3.

Each party shall pay their own attorney•s fees incurred

herein,
DATED this

day of

\_^L-#*SL—

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

ANNE M. STIRBA
D i s t r i c t Couri—Jjadge

Approved as to form:

'vO1'

KATHRYN S. DENHOLM
Attorney for Defendant
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JUDGEMENT

HUD DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG 2 2 1990

SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By

0»puly Ctorfc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SA59IOS

oOo
LISA HARTWIG,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 894900194

V.

Judge Leonard H. Russon

DAVID HARTWIG,
Defendant.
-0O0-

This

matter

having

come on regularly

for Pre-Trial

Settlement Conference on May 8, 1990, before Commissioner
Sandra N. Peuler, Judge Pro Tern of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff

appearing

in

attorney,

Sharon

Donovan, and

A.

person

and

by

and

Defendant

through

her

appearing

in

person and by and through his attorney, Kathryn Schuler
Denholm, and counsel for both parties having met with the
Court in chambers to advise the Court of the issues remaining
to be resolved, and thereafter both counsel having discussed
and resolved these matters with the parties involved herein,
and the agreement of the parties having been read into the
record

in

the

presence

of Plaintiff

and

Defendant, and

Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said agreement and
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Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings on file
herein, and Plaintiff having been sworn and examined on the
basis of the Complaint, and the Court having made and entered
herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
and upon motion of Sharon A. Donovan of Dart, Adamson &
Kasting,
NOW,

THEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED as follows:
1.

Divorce.

The

Plaintiff

be and

she

is hereby

awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant upon the
grounds

of

irreconcilable

differences,

and

the

marriage

between Plaintiff and Defendant be and the same is hereby
dissolved, and the parties are hereby free and absolutely
released from the bonds of matrimony and all the obligations
thereof with said Decree to become final upon signing and
entry.
2.
awarded

Custody/Visitation.
the

permanent

Plaintiff be and she is hereby

care, custody

and

control

of the

parties' two minor children, Benjamin James Hartwig, age 5,
born on October 17, 1984, and Nathan Meade Hartwig, age 3,
born on January 19, 1987, subject to Defendant's reasonable
rights of visitation as follows:
A.

Alternate weekends, from Friday at 6:00

p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
2
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B.
holidays:
Day;

Alternate holidays, with the following
New Years Day; Martin Luther King Jr.

President's

Day;

Easter;

Memorial

Day;

Independence Day; Pioneer Day; Labor Day; Columbus
Day; Halloween; Veterans' Day; and Thanksgiving
Day.
C.

One evening on the off week from 5:30

p.m. to 8:30 p.m.
D.

Christmas

Day

from

6:00

p.m.

through

December 2 6th at 8:00 p.m.
E.
two

Prior to the children entering school,

one-week

blocks

in

the

summer,

with

notification by June 15th for 1990 and thereafter
by May 1st of each year.

Once the children reach

the age of nine, Defendant shall be entitled to
have the children for six weeks in the summer, not
to exceed four weeks for one visitation block.
F.

Upon the children entering school, one-

half of the Christmas break and one month in the
summer for two two-week periods of time.

In the

event that the children are in year-round school,
Defendant shall be entitled to one-half of all
breaks, with no block to exceed two weeks at a time
and not to exceed one month total on an annual
3

basis prior to the children reaching nine years of
age, or to exceed six weeks total on an annual
basis after the children reach the age of nine, not
to exceed four weeks for one visitation block.
G.

Each Father's Day, regardless of whose

weekend upon which this holiday may 'fall.
H.

Each

Mother's

Day

will

be

with

the

Plaintiff, regardless whose weekend upon which this
holiday may fall.
I.

The afternoon and evening of each child's

birthday, or one day in the same week as that
child's birthday as determined by the child.
J.

If Defendant works every weekend as his

primary job and primary source of income, he shall
be entitled to one overnight visitation per week on
a

consistent

parties.

night

to

be

agreed

between

the

At such time as Defendant no longer works

every weekend as his primary job and primary source
of income, the other visitation provisions provided
herein, i.e., alternate weekends, one evening on
the off week, etc., should be implemented.
K.

The parties shall have equal access to

medical, school records and other important records
for

the

children.

Plaintiff

shall

sign

any

4
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releases that are necessary to allow the children's
school to provide Defendant with a schedule of all
the upcoming school activities.

In the event any

significant school or social events occur that are
not

on

the

schedule,

Plaintiff

shall

provide

Defendant reasonable notice in advance of those
activities.

Defendant shall be notified of non-

routine medical treatment and shall have access to
the children's medical files.
L.

Each party shall keep the other advised

of their current address and telephone numbers, as
well

as

children's

that

same

information

regular care givers.

concerning

the

Neither party

shall move their residence outside Salt Lake County
without thirty (30) days prior written notice to
the other party.
3.

Mutual Restraining Order.

The parties are mutually

restrained from harming, harassing, bothering the other or
making denigrating comments about the other in front of the
children.

To the extent that they have control over any

other third person, the parties shall restrain any third
person from making derogatory comments about the other in the
presence of the children.
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4.

Grandparent Visitation Rights.

The maternal and

paternal grandparents may be entitled to reasonable rights of
visitation with the children, upon reasonable advance notice.
Any

extended

visitation

with

the

children's

paternal

grandparents shall occur during Defendant's visitation with
them or as otherwise agreed between Plaintiff and Defendant's
parents.
consent

Plaintiff
to

grandparents.
shall

reasonable

visitation

with

withhold
the

any

paternal

Neither Plaintiff's nor Defendant's parents

interfere

children.

shall not unreasonably

with

Defendant's

visitation

with

the

The grandparent visitation shall not be tacked on

to Defendant's visitation.
5.

Child Support.

Defendant shall pay a base amount

of child support in the amount of $140.50 per month, per
child, for a total of $281.00 per month.

Defendant shall

also pay up to $250.00 for his one-half portion of the
reasonable work-related day care and there will be a cap of
$250.00 per month for the day care expenses, for a total
monthly support amount of $531.00, after giving Defendant a
credit for medical insurance premiums of $50.00 per month for
the children.

Said child support shall be paid through the

Clerk of the Court, one-half on the 5th and 20th days of each
month, until the children reach the age of eighteen and
graduate from high school in their expected senior year.
6

6.

Withhold and Deliver Order.

An Order to Withhold

and Deliver, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 62A-11-401,
et. seq. , be and is hereby ordered to be issued should the
Defendant become thirty

(30) days delinquent in his child

support obligation.
7.

Alimony.

8.

Real

Neither party shall be awarded alimony.

Estate.

Plaintiff

is hereby

awarded

the

exclusive possession and use of the parties' home, based upon
the appraisal by Jerry Webber, appraising the home for the
sum of $62,000.00, with the appraisal cost to be born equally
between the parties.
equity

Plaintiff shall be awarded any and all

in said home, and Defendant shall Quit-Claim his

interest in the home to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff shall use her

best efforts to release Defendant's V.A. Certificate, with
the parties sharing equally the reasonable cost to effectuate
the release.
9.

Personal Property,

The parties' personal property

shall be distributed as follows:
A.

To the Plaintiff:

household

goods,

otherwise

hereinbelow

goods,

furniture

furniture

and

1987 Aerostar; the
and

disposed;

furnishings
the

furnishings;

not

children's

her

personal

effects and belongings; the woodburning stove and
sleeper

sofa

which

were

purchased
7

(stove)

or

refurnished

(sofa)

with

funds

from

Defendant's

practice, with Defendant being given a credit of
$1,000.00 toward

any child

support or day care

arrearage that may exist.
B.

To

the

Defendant:

1989

Mazda

B2200

pickup; the wood shelve, work bench, decorations
and other wood items made by him; all electronics
and radio equipment; all wood working tools and
equipment; Sears radial arm saw; all law books; all
equipment and materials obtained for and used in
his practice; Osborne computer, Zenith monitor and
Epson MX 80 printer; his medical and other books.
C.

All property and all property rights that

may be vested in either party as a result of family
inheritance, trusts, or similar sources shall be
awarded

to the party

received.

from whose

Specifically,

family

it was

Defendant received

the

following personal property as part of inheritance:
circular

oak

table; various

hand

tools;

large

mechanic's style tool box on castors; shotguns,
handgun and rifles; two end table/bookcase units;
bohemian china set; and antique Zenith radio.
D.

Prior to the marriage, Defendant acquired

the following items to which the Plaintiff is not
8

entitled

to

assert

any

claim:

Sears

color

television; rocking chair; electronics equipment;
Heathkit stereo receiver; Girard turntable; Akai
reel-to-reel tape deck; three pairs of speakers;
Sears Craftsman hand tools and tool boxes; gold
flatware; the model railroad equipment and other
assorted

toys

remaining

which

were

saved

from

Defendant's childhood; all cameras and photographic
equipment;

Meade

3.1

inch

telescope;

Swift

microscope; five drawer file cabinet; 1978 Yamaha
750 cc motorcycle.
10.

Debts and Obligations.

Each party shall pay and

hold the other party harmless from liability on the following
debts:
A.

The Plaintiff:

her student loans; the

mortgage payment on the house; the debt on the 1987
Aerostar.
B.

The Defendant:

his student loans; the

debt on the 1989 Mazda.
C.

All remaining debts and obligations shall

be the responsibility of the party as they have so
divided it.
D.
other

Each party shall assume, pay and hold the

party

harmless

from

liability

all

debts

9
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incurred by that party individually since the date
of the parties' separation on January 23, 1989.
11.

Medical Insurance.

Both parties shall maintain

coverage for the children of the parties under the group
policy of major medical and dental insurance available to
them through their employment while each child remains within
the

age

limits

allowed

by

this

policy, with

the minor

children of the parties named as beneficiaries thereunder.
Each party shall pay one-half of any deductible amounts
and one-half

of any uncovered medical, dental, optic or

orthodontic expenses reasonably incurred for the benefit of
the parties' minor children.
12.

Life Insurance.

Both parties shall maintain in

full force and effect the life insurance policies they each
have on their lives in the amount of $100,000.00, until such
time as the last of the parties' minor children reaches the
age of eighteen years or is otherwise emancipated.
During

such

period,

each

party

shall

designate

irrevocably the other party as trustee for the minor children
as sole and exclusive beneficiary on said life insurance
policy.
13.

Pension and Related Assets.

The Court finds that

Plaintiff has a pension and/or profit sharing plan through

10

her

place

of

employment.

Plaintiff

shall

receive

all

benefits accrued pursuant to such plans.
14.

1989 Tax Returns.

Both parties shall file separate

tax returns for the year 1989.
15.

Tax Exemptions.

As long as Defendant is paying to

Plaintiff $200.00 per month towards the child support and
one-half of the work-related day care expenses and is current
with said obligation for the preceding tax year, Defendant
shall be entitled to claim the youngest child as a deduction
for federal and state income tax purposes.
16.

Delinquent

Support.

Defendant

shall

pay

to

Plaintiff the sum of $2,500.00, which represents a compromise
on the delinquent support owed to Plaintiff pursuant to the
Temporary Order in this matter.

If this amount is not paid

to Plaintiff by December 31, 1990, a judgment will enter
against Defendant for the unpaid balance on said sum, with
interest

running

accordingly.

Said

$2,500.00

represents

delinquent support through the first half of May, 1990.
17.

Maiden Name.

Plaintiff is hereby restored to her

maiden name of Mariea.
18.

Attorney's Fees and Costs.

Each party shall assume

and pay his and her own costs and attorney's fees incurred in
prosecuting this action.

11
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19.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to

do and perform all matters and things required by each of
them to be done herein.
DATED this

Q2 A

day of

C^U^J^UL^J

1990,

BY THE COURT:

U^y\

a^tcK^j kiUU^U^

>

SANDRA N. PEULER
Judge Pro Tern

Approved as to form:

CLuJU

JCHtJLtR 'DENHOLM
Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

j7

day of August, 1990,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Kathryn Schuler Denholm
Attorney at Law
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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ADDENDUM "B"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
HARTWIG, LISA
PLAINTIFF
VS
HARTWIG, DAVID

CASE NUMBER 894900194 DA
DATE 10/28/91
HONORABLE THOMAS N. ARNETT
COURT REPORTER NO TAPE
COURT CLERK KAD

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MODIFICATION/DIVORCE
PRESENT: DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. DONOVAN, SHARON A
D. ATTY. DENHOLM, KATHRYN SCHULER

COMMISSIONER CERTIFIES THIS FOR TRIAL ON THE FOLLOWING CONTESTED
ISSUES:
1. VISITATION. THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED THAT THE DECREE
SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE VISITATION AS FOLLOWS:
A. ALTERNATING SCHOOL BREAKS
B. LONG WEEKENDS, WHEN THE CHILDREN ARE NOT IN SCHOOL AND
TO OCCUR NO MORE THAN FOUR TO SIX WEEKS APART.
C. NON-SCHEDULED VISITS IN THE CHILDRENS' HOME STATE WITH
14 DAYS NOTICE AND SAID VISITS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE
CHILDRENS' ACTIVITIES.
D. TELEPHONE VISITATION TO OCCUR AT SAID DAY AND TIME.
E. ALTERNATING CHRISTMAS WITH DEFENDANT TO BEGIN IN 1991.
THE PARTIES COULD NOT AGREE ON SUMMER VISITATION AND THE
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE DEFENDNANT BE GRANTED ONEHALF OF THE SCHOOL SUMMER VACATION.
2. PERSONS ENTITLED TO DELIVER OR PICK UP CHILDREN. COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S PRESENT HUSBAND BE
ENTITLED TO PICK-UP OR DELIVER THE CHILDREN WHEN THE PLAINTIFF IS UNABLE FOR THOSE DUTIES.
3. TRANSPORTATION COSTS. THE PARTIES DISPARITY IN INCOMES IS
REFLECTED IN THE VERY MODEST CHILD SUPPORT AWARD, AND THE

"CAP" ON THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO SHARE IN THE PLAINT I F F ' S CHILD CARE EXPENSES.
THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER
RECOMMENDS THAT THE PARTIES CONTRIBUTE EQUALLY TO TRANSPORTATION COSTS FOR TWO V I S I T S PER YEAR.
FURTHER, THAT THE
"DESTINATION PARENT" BE THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSPORTATION AT THE BEGINNING OR CONCLUSION OF EACH V I S I T .
THIS
RECOMMENDATION I S ALSO BASED ON THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF
MOVED TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO ENABLE HER PRESENT HUSBAND TO ENTER THE SEMINARY AND WAS NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF
INTERFERING WITH THE DEFENDANT'S VISITATION RIGHTS.
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF SUBMIT MEDICAL EXPENSES TO THE DEFENDANT WITHIN 9 0 DAYS
THIS ISSUE MAY BE MOOT AS SET OUT BELOW.
C H I L D CARE EXPENSES.
THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO COOPERATE BETWEEN THEMSELVES TO EFFECT PAYMENT OF PAST C H I L D
CARE EXPENSES, W I T H EACH PARTY D I S P U T I N G WHAT I S REASONABLE
AND I T WAS WORK-RELATED.
THE P L A I N T I F F ' S CURRENT C H I L D CARE
EXPENSES ARE I N EXCESS OF $ 9 0 0 . 0 0 / M O . AND THE " C A P " I N THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE L I M I T S THE TOTAL OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT TO $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 .
THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE
DEFENDANT SIMPLY PAY AN ONGOING MONTHLY AMOUNT OF $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 TOWARD CHILD
CARE EXPENSES AND THAT THE PARTIES NOT BE REQUIRED TO DEAL WITH EACH
OTHER I N TERMS OF INVOICES OR ACCOUNTINGS. ON THE ISSUE OF PAST CHILD
CARE EXPENSES, THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT THE PARTIES EXCHANGE
ACCOUNTINGS THROUGH COUNSEL TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER.
HEALTH INSURANCE. THE PARTIES APPARENTLY HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S HEALTH CARE COVERAGE MAY BE RESTRICTED TO THE STATE OF
UTAH. THEREFORE, THE COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS THAT WHICHEVER PARTY
CAN OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE AT THE LOWEST PREMIUM COMBINED WITH THE
BEST COVERAGE SHOULD DO SO AND THE CREDIT TO THE DEFENDANT FOR HEALTH
INSURANCE PREMIUM BE ADJUSTED I F HE I S NO LONGER THE PARENT REQUIRED TO
CARRY THE SAME.
ATTORNEYS FEES. THE COMMISSIONER FINDS THAT BOTH PARTIES ARE ACTING I N
GOOD FAITH AND, THEREFORE, EACH PARTY SHOULD BE ORDERED TO ASSUME AND
PAY H I S OR HER OWN ATTORNEYS FEES.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG),
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID HARTWIG,

MINUTE ENTRY
CIVIL NO. B94900194
COMMISSIONER SANDRA PEULER
UNDER ADVISEMENT RECOMMENDATION
COURT CLERK: SPO
DATE: 9/29/92

Defendant.

TYPE OF HEARING:

MOTION HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY:
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY:

SHARON A. DONOVAN
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM

COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS:
THE COMMISSIONER HAVING HEARD ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL
HAVING
FURTHER
REVIEWED
PLEADINGS
FILED
HEREIN,
COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDS AS FOLLOWS:

AND
THE

1.
AS TO THE ISSUE OF CHILD SUPPORT, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD
PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION OF PAYMENTS MADE, TO SUPPORT HIS
ASSERTION THAT HE IS CURRENT. THE ISSUE OF ANY JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE RESERVED AT THIS TIME, PENDING THAT ACCOUNTING BEING
PROVIDED.
COUNSEL MAY SCHEDULE A CONFERENCE CALL WITH THE
COMMISSIONER TO CONCLUDE THIS ISSUE, IF IT REMAINS UNRESOLVED
AFTER THE ACCOUNTING HAS BEEN DONE.
2.
AS TO CHILD CARE, THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED A
JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $369.87, REPRESENTING CHILD CARE
EXPENSES OWED BY DEFENDANT FOR JUNE AND JULY 1992. THE
COMMISSIONER FINDS THAT CHILD CARE EXPENSES REMAIN OWING TO THE
PROVIDER EVEN DURING PERIODS OF VACATION OR VISITATION, IN
ORDER TO HOLD THE CHILD'S PLACE WITH THAT PROVIDER, AND THAT
DEFENDANT SHOULD PAY HIS SHARE.

nocn

HARTWIG V. HARTWIG

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE TWO

3.
AS TO CHILD CARE EXPENSES INCURRED FROM AUGUST 1992
THROUGH THE PRESENT DATE, NO JUDGMENT SHOULD ENTER, AS THE
COMMISSIONER FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NOT BEEN EMPLOYED.
4.
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO REFRAIN FROM
DEDUCTING AMOUNTS FROM COURT-ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT OR CHILD
CARE PAYMENTS, EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE COURT, OR AGREED BY
THE PARTIES.
5.
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ISSUE
OF CONTEMPT; THEREFORE, NO CONTEMPT IS RECOMMENDED,
6.
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD PROVIDE HIS RESIDENCE ADDRESS TO
PLAINTIFF, THROUGH COUNSEL.
7.

EACH PARTY SHOULD PAY HIS OR HER OWN FEES.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IS DIRECTED
CONSISTENT WITH THIS RECOMMENDATION.

TO

PREPARE

AN

ORDER

Z/ -~^c<\.^/'l£>^fe^S
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy,
of the foregoing Minute Entry,

to the following, this

day of September, 1992:

Sharon A, Donovan
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 S. Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Kathryn Schuler Denholm
Attorney for Defendant
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

n?ni

FULE0 D&Y&ff? G3HBT
Third Judicial District

MAY 1 3 1992
^JS^LAKEJpoJjNTY

KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866
Attorney for Defendant
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 484-0091

ay.
DiputyClwK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG),
Plaintiff,

*
*
*

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

vs

*

DAVID HARTWIG,

*

Civil No. 894900194

*

Judge Stirba

Defendants

Comes now Defendant, by counsel, and objects to the proposed
Findings, Conclusions and Order in this matter as follows:
1.

The court considered but made no finding concerning the

contents of the Decree heretofore entered in this matter, the
contents of which are not an appropriate part of the Findings.
2.

The court made no findings concerning the contents of

paragraphs 2a, 2b, and a portion of 2c in the proposed findings and
related paragraphs in the Order.

Defendant specifically objects

to the sentence in paragraph 2a "Plaintiff's employment in the
state of Utah was also in the process of being phased out" which
was not found by the Court and the sentence "the overall cost of

1

0211

living . . . for a very modest home".
3. Defendant further proposes that the Court find, as a part
of paragraph 2c that the children had a full time inhouse day care
provider in Utah, but did not attend Montessori in Utah.
4. Defendant objects to the two full paragraphs beginning at
the top of page 8 of the proposed Findings of Fact and the related
provisions in the Conclusions and Order.

These paragraphs are

direct quotes from Judge Stirba's comments and reflect her thought
processes rather than findings in this matter; in faqt, her
findings are contained in the next succeeding paragraph.
5.

Defendant objects to the phrase in paragraph 5 "which is

less than one-half the actual day care costs incurred by Plaintiff
when she resided in Utah" which phrase is not included in the
judge's comments and which is, in fact, not accurate in that the
Plaintiff's day care expenses at the time the Decree of Divorce was
entered were adjusted in part by reason of the fact that Plaintiff
received house keeping benefits from the day care provider, and in
part because

Defendant's

income was

substantially

less than

Plaintiff's.
6.

Defendant objects to paragraph 6 for the reason that the

same was not found by the court and is not, in fact, accurate.
WHEREFORE, Defendant having specified his objections to the
proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order, prays that an Order enter
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consistent with these objections.
DATED this

\J>

day of May, 1992,

enholm
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Objection to Sharon Donovan, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 310 South
Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah
May, 1992.

84101 on this

|MtkWi

Secretary
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ADDENDUM " C "

^uoundjjxe visitation should be defined as the parents may agree.
If they are not able to agree, reasonable visitation will routinely be
defined for school-age (beginning kindergarten) children as follows:
Alternate
Weekends:

Friday 6 p.m. - Sunday 6 p.m.

2.

Midweek:

alternate Wednesday, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.

3.

Holidays:

(A^Christmas - non-custodial parent to have
Christmas day beginning at 1:00 p.m. and continuing
through 1/2 of the child's total Christmas school
vacation.

1.

(B) Thanksgiving and Easter - non-custodial parent
to have Thanksgiving in even years (1990, 92, 94,
etc.); Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6 p.m.
until Sunday 6 p.m. Non-custodial parent to have
Easter in odd years (1991, 93, 95, etc.); Easter
holiday is Friday 6 p.m. until Sunday 6 p.m.
(C) Other Holidays - New Year's Day, Martin Luther
King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 4th,
July 24th and Labor Day.
These are to be
alternated, with the non-custodial parent to have
visitation beginning 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 6 p.m. on the holiday.
Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation
and no changes should be made to the regular
rotation of the alternating weekend schedule.
4.

Father's DayMother's Day:

as appropriate, 6 p.m. the day before until 6
p.m. the day of.

5.

Birthdays:

one evening, 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during the
week of the child's birthday and the non-custodial
parent's birthday.

6.

Extended
visitation:

(A)
Summer - 4 weeks continuous, with written
notice of dates provided to custodial parent by May
1st. Custodial parent to have alternate weekends,
holiday and phone visitation.
(B) Year Round school - two 2 week periods, with
written notice of dates to custodial parent at least
30 days prior to visitation. Custodial parent to
have holiday and phone visitation.
(C) Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year
uninterrupted possession of the children for
purposes of vacation, provided the same does not
interfere with holiday visitation per above. Each
parent shall notify the other in writing of such two
week period at least 30 days in advance.

Telephone:
8.

reasonable, before 8 p.m.

Other times as agreed.

30-3-4.1

HUSBAND AND WIFE

30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L 1989, ch.
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,

authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court commissioners, effective April 23, 1990

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Division of debts
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children; and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
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(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
good faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1;
1991, ch. 257, § 4.

Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts
or obligations" in the introductory paragraph
of Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the
end of Subsection (3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Alimony.
—Amount.
—"Equitable restitution."
—Modification.
—Standard of living.
—Termination.
—Waiver.
Appeal and review.
—Findings required.
Children.
—Custody.
Modification.
—Support.
Availability.
Effect of child's absence.
"In-kind" agreement.
Modification.
Costs.
—Partnership.
Court's powers and jurisdiction.
Property division.
—Advanced degrees.
—Antenuptial agreement.
—Closely-held corporations.
—Contributions.
—Discretion of court.
—Gifts.
—Partnership.
—Postnuptial agreement.
—Professional practice.
—Retirement funds.
—Right to reproduce creative work.
—Time of valuation.
—Valuation.
Res judicata.
Stipulations and agreements of parties.
Visitation rights.

Cited.
Alimony.
Alimony should, so far as possible, equalize
the parties' standards of living. Munns v.
Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Proper distribution of property interests of
one sort or another should come first, and only
then would alimony need to be considered.
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Exact equality of income is not required, but
sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on
equal footing financially as of the time of the
divorce is required. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d
1209 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).
Divorce decree provision requiring the husband to continue to pay utilities for as long as
the wife lived at the marital residence was in
the nature of continuing spousal support and,
therefore, considered to be alimony. Hagan v.
Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed
in light of the standard of living they had during marriage. In some circumstances, it may be
appropriate to try to equalize the spouses' respective standards of living. Martinez v.
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).
When a marriage of long duration dissolves
on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change, unless unrelated to
the efforts put forward by the spouses during
marriage, should be given some weight in fashioning the support award. Thus, if one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced
through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-7.5

78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parents share of
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer
statements and income tax returns.
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78-45-7.5

JUDICIAL CODE

(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
> approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a

parent, the income shall be based" for "Income
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Modification of award.
Cited.
Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred
in modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the

support amount without finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred
since the previous order had been entered.
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(1 )(b) prior to 1990
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on
existing support orders).
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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78-45-7.16

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec 25.

78-45-7.15. Medical and dental expenses — Insurance.
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums for children are
included in the base combined child support obligation table.
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the table.
The child support order shall require:
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental
expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and immunizations; and
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable and necessary uninsured
medical and dental expenses in a ratio to be determined by the appropriate court or administrative agency.
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost
and the children would gain more complete coverage by doing so, both
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance for the dependent children.
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a reasonable cost or
if no advantage to the children's coverage would result, the parent who
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be ordered to maintain that
insurance.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.15, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 17; 1990, ch. 100, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection
(2Mb), deleted "equally" after "share" and
added the language beginning "in a ratio "

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec 25

78-45-7,16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred.
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable work-related child care
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of the parents shall
be specified as a separate monthly amount in the order.
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order ceases
to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly payment of that
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the
child support order.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.16, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, ch. 100, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, in Subsection
(1) deleted "(a) The monthly amount of all
known reasonable and necessary uninsured extraordinary medical expenses and" from the
beginning, deleted "in addition to the base
child support award" after "to be paid," and
substituted "a separate monthly amount" for
"two separate monthly amounts"; redesignated

former Subsection (1Kb) as Subsection (2), and
deleted former Subsection (2), which read "Unless the expenses described in Subsection (1)
are included in the child support order, or the
parents enter into a written agreement to
share the expenses, one parent may not obligate both parents to pay the expenses "
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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78-45-7.17

JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-7.17. Child care costs.
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is presumed if the custodial parent is working and actually incurring the child care
costs.
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be
awarded on a case by case basis if the costs are related to the career or
occupational training of the custodial parent.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 19.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25

78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered.
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table or for the
award of uninsured medical expenses except under Subsection (2).
(2) If the combination of the two amounts under Subsection (1) exceeds 50%
of the obligor's adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs, the
total child support award would exceed 50% of the obligors adjusted gross
income, the presumption under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.18, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 20; 1990, ch. 100, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "extraordmary" before "medical expenses" in Sub-

section (1) and deleted "that" after "or" m Subsection (2).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability.
(1) The district court may issue an order determining the amount of a
parent's liability for uninsured medical, hospital, and dental expenses of a
dependent child, when the parent:
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to:
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of the dependent
child; or
(ii) obtain medical, hospital, or dental care insurance but fails to
do so; or
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under insurance coverage
obtained after the prior court or administrative order was issued.
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not specify what proportions of the expenses are to be shared, the district court may determine the
amount of liability as may be reasonable and necessary.
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when it was issued.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.19, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 166, § 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 166 be-

came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25
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Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).
Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
——Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480

P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr.
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v.
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
§ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=> 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately it*
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
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considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.

Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.
—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facts by jury.
Intent.
Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
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The requirement that an olographic will
be written by the hand of the testator is
spelled out in Article 1588 of the Louisiana
Civil Code which reads as follows:
The olographic testament is that which is
written by the testator himself.
In order to be valid, it must be entirely
written, dated and signed by the hand of
the testator. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made anywhere, even
out of the State.
Article 2903 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure places the burden of proving that
an olographic testament was "entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the
testator" on the proponent of the purported
will Article 2903 states:
At the contradictory trial to probate a
testament, its proponent bears the burden
of proving the authenticity of the testament, and its oompliance with all of the
formal requirements of law.
[2] The requisites of meeting this burden are spelled out in Article 2883 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which states:
The olographic testament must be proved
by the testimony of two credible witnesses that the testament was entirely written, dated, and signed in the testator's
handwriting. The court must satisfy itself, through interrogation or from the
depositions of the witnesses, that the
handwriting and signature are those of
the testator, and must mention these
facts in its proces verbal.
In the present case, therefore, the burden
of proving that the purported will was entirely written by the hand of the testator
rested with Louise King Posey. In order to
prove this, she would have needed to have
produced two witnesses to testify as to the
genuineness of the writing and the signature in the document purported to be the
will of Harold Rudolph Posey. However,
Ms. Posey herself was the only witness to
testify that the printing and the signature
in the purported will was that of the decedent. Thus, since proponent failed to meet
the requirement of producing two witnesses
found in Article 2883, she did not carry her
burden of proving the validity of the purported will. See Succession of Sullivan, 178

La. 230,151 So. 190 (1933) and Succession of
Lewis 174 La. 901, 142 So. 121 (1932).
For the reasons assigned, the judgment
of the District Court is affirmed. All costs
of this appeal are to be borne by appellant.
AFFIRMED.
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Carole Calvert CREECH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Bob Newton CREECH,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 6792.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana,
Third Circuit.
Feb. 5, 1979.
Divorced father proceeded by rule for
extended visitation rights, and divorced
mother reconvened for additional child support. The 7th Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia, Richard P. Boyd, Jr., J.,
extended visitation privileges and increased
child support, and divorced mother appealed. The Court of Appeal, Domengeaux, J.,
held that: (1) increase of child support obligation from $300 per month to $325 per
month did not constitute abuse of discretion, where divorced father's annual salary
was $28,000, with housing provided by employer, divorced mother, who was unemployed at time of original child support
decree, had take-home pay of approximately $350 per month, and father had certain
obligations which he did not have when
support was initially awarded, and (2)
where divorced father, under original visitation decree, had visitation rights of one
weekend per month, the last week in December, and two weeks in the summer, but,
because of expense and difficulty involved
in traveling to United States from Mexico
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where he worked, divorced father was virtually unable to visit his children one weekend each month, increase in divorced father^ summer visitation period from two
weeks to five weeks was not abuse of discretion and did not amount to split or divided custody.
Affirmed.
1. Divorce <*=> 309.4
Increase of child support obligation
from $300 per month to $325 per month did
not constitute abuse of discretion, where
divorced father's annual salary was $28,000,
with housing provided by employer, divorced mother, who was unemployed at time of
original child support decree, had takehome pay of approximately $350 per month,
and father had certain obligations which he
did not have when support was initially
awarded.
2. Infants «=> 19.3(4)
Minors: Test of whether award of visitation rights is excessive is whether the
frequency or length of visitation will be
detrimental to the welfare of the child.
3. Divorce *=> 303(4)
Where divorced father, under original
visitation decree, had visitation rights of
one weekend per month, the last week in
December, and two weeks in the summer,
but, because of expense and difficulty involved in traveling to United States from
Mexico where he worked, divorced father
was virtually unable to visit his children
one weekend each month, increase in divorced father's summer visitation period
from two weeks to five weeks was not
abuse of discretion and did not amount to
split or divided custody.
Patrick McDonough, III, Vidalia, for
plaintiff-appellant.
Philip Letard, Vidalia, for defendant-appellee.
Before DOMENGEAUX, FORET and
STOKER, JJ.

DOMENGEAUX, Judge.
Carole Calvert Creech was granted a legal separation and, ultimately, a divorce
from Bob Newton Creech. She received the
permanent custody of the couple's two minor children, and Mr. Creech was allowed
specific visitation privileges. Additionally,
the mother was awarded $300.00 per month
for child support.
Subsequently, Mr. Creech proceeded by
rule for extended visitation rights, and Mrs.
Creech reconvened for additional child support.
At hearing, the father's visitation privileges were extended and child support was
increased. Mrs. Creech now appeals contending that the increase in child support
was inadequate and that the modified visitation privileges, if allowed to stand, would
perpetuate "split or divided" custody.
CHILD SUPPORT
[1] The child support was increased
from $300.00 to $325.00 per month, and,
additionally, Mr. Creech was ordered to
maintain dental and medical insurance for
the children. Although the father's annual
salary was found to be $28,000.00, with
housing provided by his employer, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his
discretion in view of the limited factual
information before us. We also note that,
at the time of the original child support
decree, the mother was unemployed. She is
now employed, having take home pay of
approximately $350.00 per month. The obligation to support, maintain, and educate
the children extends to the mother. La.C.C.
Art. 227.
Additionally, the district judge noted that
Mr. Creech now has certain obligations
which he did not have when support was
initially awarded. Appellant does not contend that the written narrative entitled
"Statement of Facts" has inaccurately portrayed that fact.1 Without the benefit of a
transcript of the parties' testimony, we

1. The statement of facts was prepared and signed by the trial judge at appellant's request,
pursuant to La.C.C.P. Art. 2131.
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must accept this finding made by the trial
court. McDonald v. McDonald, 357 So.2d
1293 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1978). The $25.00
per month increase was an attempt by the
trial court to, as he said: "balance present
needs against present ability to pay." On
the basis of the record before us, we find
the increase in the support award within
the bounds of the trial judge's discretion.
VISITATION PRIVILEGES
[2] In the recent case of McDonald v.
McDonald, supra, we held that an award of
visitation rights totaling 81 days annually
was not excessive. The true test is whether
the frequency or length of visitation will be
detrimental to the welfare of the child.
Mr. Creech is now working in Vera Cruz,
Mexico. Because of the expense and difficulty involved in traveling to the States, he
was virtually unable to visit his children
one weekend each month, as was originally
provided for in the judgment of divorce.
The trial judge concluded: "Therefore, the
Court felt that the best interest of the
children would be served and fairness would
prevail upon the part of all parties if a
summer visitation period was increased
from two weeks to five weeks
. . ."
By enabling meaningful visitation with
their father, this arrangement could be
more beneficial to the children.
[3] Under the original visitation decree,
the defendant had visitation rights of one
weekend per month, the last week in December, and two weeks in the summer.
The essence of the judge's present ruling
was to grant three additional weeks of summer visitation in lieu of weekend visitation.
As stated above, in the McDonald case, we
let stand a visitation grant giving the father four weeks during the summer, five
days at Christmas, and weekend visitation,
which resulted in a total of 81 days. Under
the circumstances presented in this case,
the visitation award gives Mr. Creech approximately six weeks (45 days) with his
children and does not amount to "split or
divided" custody. Further, there has been
no showing that the period allowed is of
such duration as to cause confusion among
the children as to parental authority. Poole

v. Poole, 270 So.2d 215 (La.App. 1st Cir.
1972).
Mrs. Creech indicated concern over the
possibility that Mr. Creech might not return
the children once they were removed from
the United States. Recognizing this potential problem, the district court mandated
that Mr. Creech post a $5,000.00 bond before taking the children to Mexico. We
appreciate the worries of the appellant,
however, under the original visitation
grant, Mr. Creech had the children for the
last week of December and two weeks in
the summer. This time would have been
sufficient to remove the children to Mexico
if appellee had intended to do so. Under
the present decree, appellant is given more
protection with the posting of a bond, which
would be forfeited if the children are not
returned timely.
There has been no showing of error or
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge.
For the above reasons, the judgment is
affirmed at appellant's costs.
AFFIRMED.
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Robert PELOQUIN, Indiv., etc.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

CALCASIEU PARISH POLICE JURY et
al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 6793.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana,
Third Circuit.
Feb. 5, 1979.
Plaintiffs sued defendants for damages
for conversion of their pet cat, for value of
cat, and for mental anguish, inconvenience,
and humiliation suffered due to defendants
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statute if its meaning is clear from the
language employed. Id. In the same
light, we will look to the object to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs
sought to be remedied in reaching a reasonable or liberal construction which will best
effect its purpose rather than one which
will defeat it. Shidler v. All American
Life & Financial, 298 N.W.2d 318, 321
(Iowa 1980).
[2] The appellee/mother urges the language of section 600A.3 clearly leads to a
conclusion it is the exclusive remedy in
termination cases. There is no reported
decision on point, however, a 1987 Iowa
Supreme Court decision aids us in our
analysis. In its decision addressing the
admissibility of hearsay evidence in termination proceedings, the court began its
analysis by following the provisions of
chapter 600A until it reached section
600A.5. Here the court noted the statutes
bisected forming separate procedural paths
for the resolution of disputed termination
proceedings. In Interest of E.J.R., 400
N.W.2d 531, 533 (Iowa 1987). Important
here is the court acknowledged section
600A.3 (which provides termination ''shall
be accomplished only according to the provisions of this chapter") as its storting
point, indicating its belief that 600A.3 is
where the legislature has given exclusive
authority to terminate parental rights.
E.J.R., 400 N.W.2d at 531. We agree with
this analysis.
Chapter 600A was adopted prior to 1966
when the juvenile justice act was enacted
(now chapter 232) and the legislature has
never acted to amend or repeal section
600A.3. The legislature therefore intended
to provide in chapter 232 a second procedure for instituting termination proceedings, but not for the actual termination
itself. Thus, we determine section 600A.9
is applicable to all termination proceedings.
Finally, we note the golden thread running through both chapter 600A and chapter 232 is the best interests of the child.
We do not believe the liberal intent of the
legislature to assure the best interests of
the child can be accomplished by a construction which would tie the hands of ju-

venile courts in these matters. These provisions should be construed broadly to ensure the court has the ability to achieve its
statutorily mandated goal of protecting and
providing for the best interests of the children involved. To decide this case differently, would work against the legislature's
stated intent.
AFFIRMED.

In re MARRIAGE OF Susan
HATZIEVGENAKIS and
Vassilis Hatzievgenakis,
Upon the Petition of Susan Hatzievgenakis, Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning Vassilis Hatzievgenakis,
Respondent-Appellant.
No. 88-388.
Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Nov. 29, 1988.

The District Court, Marion County,
James Brown and Jerrold Jordan, JJ., entered decree dissolving marriage, and husband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Sackett, J., held that: (1) refusal to grant
continuance to husband whose employment
as cruise ship captain required him to be
out of the country at time of dissolution
trial was not abuse of discretion; (2) restrictions placed on out-of-country visitation between son and husband, who was
Greek citizen, were unreasonable; (3) property division would be modified; and (4)
child support would be reduced from $500
to $400 per month.
Affirmed as modified.
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1. Appeal and Error <s=»966(l)
Pretrial Procedure <s=»713
Granting of motion to continue trial is
at discretion of trial court and will be overturned on appeal only where there is clear
abuse of discretion.
2. Appeal and Error <s=>1043(7)
Prejudice must be shown to require
reversal of judgment for denial of motion
to continue trial.
3. Divorce @=»145
Refusal to grant continuance to cruise
ship captain who was scheduled to be on
duty on date of dissolution trial was not
abuse of discretion, even though captain
had not requested any previous continuances and had filed pleadings and other court
papers in timely manner, where captain did
not request continuance until 11 days before trial, despite receiving notice of date
four months previously.
4. Divorce <©=»301
Unreasonable restrictions on out-ofcountry visitation by Greek citizen with his
son were not justified where mother's fears
that her son would not be returned from
Greece were not supported by any evidence.
5. Divorce <s*300
Restriction imposed on out-of-country
visitation by Greek father with his son,
that father have at least two visitations
with son prior to any trip to Greece, was
unreasonable where father's work schedule
as captain of cruise vessel, geography and
expense made required visits impossible.
6. Divorce <£=>261
Provisions making out-of-country visitation by Greek father with son contingent
on payment of child support and property
settlement were not in accord with state
law and would be stricken.
7. Divorce e=>252.3(l), 252.4
Appropriate property division for parties who had net worth of approximately
$12,000 plus household goods and vehicles
was to award wife all household goods and
furnishings in her possession, vehicle, and
her checking and savings accounts, and to

award husband lot in foreign country, his
vehicle and foreign bank accounts and to
require him to pay $3,000 to wife in addition to satisfying $2,120 worth of her credit
card debt.
8. Divorce <s=>308
Award of $500 per month for support
of one child would be modified to $400 per
month where father grossed $2,293 monthly and netted $1,985.
Steven W. Guiter, of Johnston, Hicks &
Guiter, Knoxville, for respondent-appellant.
Garold F. Heslinga, of Heslinga, Heslinga, Dixon & Grotewold, Oskaloosa, for petitioner-appellee.
Considered by OXBERGER, C.J., and
DONIELSON and SACKETT, JJ.
SACKETT, Judge.
Respondent-appellant Vassilis Hatzievgenakis appeals the decree dissolving his marriage to petitioner-appellee Susan Hatzievgenakis. He contends the trial court (1)
should have granted his motion for continuance, (2) should not have placed unreasonable restrictions on allowing him to take his
son outside the United States for visitation,
and (3) made an inequitable property and
child support award. We affirm as modified.
The parties were married in 1980. Susan, a resident of Marion County, Iowa, is a
travel agent. Vassilis, a Greek national, is
a ship captain. They have a child who was
born in Iowa in 1982. The child is a United
States and Greek citizen. Susan maintains
a residence in Marion County; Vassilis
maintains a residence in Greece.
On April 27, 1987, Susan filed in Marion
County for a dissolution of their marriage.
Vassilis was personally served in New Orleans on May 21,1987, and on June 9,1987,
Vassilis answered the petition and in doing
so submitted to the jurisdiction of the Iowa
court on all issues. He requested joint
custody of the child. On October 7, 1987,
Vassilis filed a financial statement and on
November 7, 1987, Susan filed a financial
statement. Interrogatories were pro-
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pounded to Vassilis which were answered
October 7, 1987.
Neither party filed a trial certificate.
See Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 181.
However, on August 21, 1987, the court on
its own motion in an attempt to comply
with case disposition time standards established by the Iowa Supreme Court, ordered
<a scheduling conference. An order was
issued September 11, 1987 closing discovery on December 10, 1987; closing
pleadings on December 17, 1987 and setting the trial for January 28, 1988. A copy
of the order was mailed to Vassilis' attorney on September 14, 1987. On January
11, 1988, Vassilis filed a motion to continue
claiming his tour of duty as a Staff Captain
for a Greek cruise ship sailing in the Cape
Horn area of South America made it impossible to attend the January trial. He asked
for a continuance until late June or July
1988. Susan resisted. The trial court
overruled the motion.
I.
[1-3] Vassilis contends the trial court
erred in not granting a continuance. The
granting or denial of a motion for continuance is in the discretion of the trial court
and will be interfered with on appeal only
where there is a clear abuse of discretion.
Department of Gen, Servs., State of Iowa
v. R.M. Boggs Co., Inc., 336 N.W.2d 408,
410 (Iowa 1983); Estate of Lovell, 344
N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa App.1983). Prejudice must be shown to require a reversal
for denial for such a motion. Cavanagh v.
O'Connor, 194 Iowa 670, 186 N.W. 907
(1922). It must be shown an injustice has
been done. In re Tomin's Estate, 260
Iowa 1129, 152 N.W.2d 286 (1967). Ordinarily an abuse is found to exist only
where there is not support in the record for
the trial court's action. Rath v. Sholty,
199 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 1972).
Vassilis signs on a ship for an extended
period of time. His employment may be
jeopardized if he leaves the ship during his
tour of service. This was the first time the
case was set for trial. Vassilis has not
requested any other continuances and appears to have filed pleadings and financial

information in a timely manner. He did
not request a continuance until eleven days
before trial despite the fact the case had
been set since September 1987.
Vassilis has failed to show the trial court
abused its discretion in not granting him a
continuance.
II.
[4] Vassilis contends the trial court unduly restricted his out of country visitation.
The decree provided Vassilis have reasonable visitation with the child in the continental United States and he have the right
commencing in the summer of 1989 to take
the child to Greece or outside the United
States, but before he could exercise out-ofcountry visitation with his son he be required to first meet the following conditions:
(1) That he have at least two significant
visitations with the child within the six
months prior to the visit;
(2) He 'post a bond with the Marion
County Clerk of Court in the amount
of $20,000 cash or surety;
(3) All child support payments then be
current;
,
(4) His property settlement payments ordered previously be paid by the Respondent.
(5) He pay the travel expenses.
Vassilis contends the first four restrictions should be removed or modified. Vassilis was named a joint custodian. He has
met the joint custody test. See In re Marriage of Ley da, 355 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Iowa
1984). The trial court has determined the
child can go to Greece. Susan has not
cross-appealed on either issue.
The only thing we must determine is
whether the trial court imposed too many
restrictions. There is no evidence Vassilis
has ever threatened or indicated he would
keep the child in Greece. Susan's request
for the restrictions was based on the following evidence. She was concerned about
the child going to Greece because she lived
in Greece. She feels there is no separation
of church and state in Greece. Greece is a
male oriented society and in a dissolution
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the father gets custody. Susan read an
article and saw a television show that convinced her she would have problems returning the child from Greece. The child
does not speak Greek.
We recognize there are sometimes problems securing the return from a foreign
country of a child to a custodial parent in
the United States, particularly where the
noncustodial parent is a citizen of the other
country and once out of the United States
the child no longer has the rights and liberties of the United States Constitution.

Goldstein, 202 Cal.App.2d 582, 20 Cal.Rptr.
903 (1962). In Louisiana the court allowed
the father to exercise visitation in Mexico
finding it would be impossible for the children to spend time with him unless they
went to Mexico where he worked. See
Creech v. Creech, 367 So.2d 1244 (La.Ct.
App.1979). In Oregon the court did not
prohibit visitation where the mother had a
fear but no facts indicating the children
would not be returned. See In re Marriage of Ross, 45 Or.App. 565, 608 P.2d
1214 (1980).

The Iowa court recently was confronted
with the problem of a father who while his
marriage dissolution was pending in Iowa
sent his child to his home country of Jordan. He remained in Iowa. Nearly two
years later the child had not been returned
to Iowa despite numerous orders directing
the father to return the child to Iowa. See
Amro v. Iowa Dist Ct for Story County,
429 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 1988).

There is nothing in this record and Susan
has presented no evidence other than her
fears to support her position. Vassilis has
appeared and consented to the jurisdiction
of the Iowa courts on all issues. There is
no evidence he has thwarted Susan's custody in any way. He has the right to assume
we will offer him the same justice we offer
Susan. While she expresses fears the child
will not be allowed to leave Greece, she
asks our courts to prevent the child from
leaving the United States.

We find after reviewing Vassilis' financial statement the restrictions imposed m\\
effectively preclude Vassilis from having
his child visit with him in Greece. We have
long subscribed to a philosophy children of
broken homes should have substantial contacts with both parents. See In re Marriage of Jerome, 378 N.W.2d 302, 305
(Iowa App.1985). The world does not end
at the borders of Iowa. These parties lived
with the child in both Greece and the United States. Susan is a travel agent. Vassilis is a Greek ship captain. Both are sophisticated and knowledgeable about international travel. They come from diverse cultures and backgrounds. The child is a citizen of two countries and has a right to be
introduced and exposed to both. The child
has a grandmother, an aunt and uncle and
cousins he will not know unless he travels
to Greece.
We examine provisions for authorizing
out of the country visitation by noncustodial parents in other jurisdictions. In California the court allowed visitation in South
Africa, determining the children would benefit from visiting with this father in his
home community and the children would be
well cared for by the father. See Milne v.

Our hope for justice for our citizens in
foreign courts can best be forwarded by
our efforts to offer fair and equitable treatment to foreign nationals in our jurisdiction. We cannot assume Vassilis will not
honor our decree.
[5] We examine the restrictions imposed by the trial court. Vassilis contends
the requirement for him to have two visitations prior to the trip should be removed.
He contends his work schedule, geography
and expense makes the required visits impossible. While ideally we would like to
see this child have frequent contacts with
his father before spending a month with
him, we find as Vassilis argues geography,
work schedule and expense makes such a
requirement prohibitive. We agree with
Vassilis and strike that provision.
[6] Vassilis next contends the provisions making the visitation contingent on
payment of child support and the property
settlement are not in accord with the dictates of Iowa case law. We agree. The
Iowa court has said the opportunity for
association with one's noncustodial parent
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should not be denied because there has not
been compliance with the support-money
provisions of a decree. See Sweat v.
Sweat, 238 Iowa 999, 1009-10, 29 N.W.2d
180, 185 (1947) (the court modified a decree
to strike provisions making visitation contingent on the payment of child support)
and Fitch v. Fitch, 207 Iowa 1193, 1196,
224 N.W. 503 (1929) (where the court modified the decree to strike a provision visitation was contingent on the payment of alimony).
Following the dictates of Sweat and
Fitch we strike from the visitation requirement the provision that all property settlement and alimony be paid before out-ofcountry visitation is authorized. In doing
so, however, we find it incumbent to remind Vassilis that courts of this state expects him to comply with the terms of the
decree. We consider his obligation to support his child to be a most serious one and
his failure to pay could subject him, among
other things, to the contempt power of the
Iowa courts.
Vassilis contends the bond requirement
should be reduced. He offered to post a
bond and does not disagree with a bond
requirement; rather he contends his financial condition prevents him from posting a
$20,000 bond. We find the bond should be
reduced to $10,000.
III.
[7] Vassilis contends the property division is not equitable. The trial court ordered Vassilis to pay Susan $11,500 as a
property settlement, $1,500 toward her
credit card indebtedness and $600 toward
attorney fees. He contends the award is
not equitable. Vassilis claims the parties
have assets of $10,000. Susan contends
they have net assets of about $100,000,
including a condominium in Greece she
claims has a value of $85,000 and is not
encumbered. Vassilis denies owning the
condominium. The only evidence of condominium ownership is Susan's testimony
that Vassilis told her once they owned the
condominium and another time they did
not. Susan also contends $8,300 was transferred to Greece in 1983 for the condomin-

ium. Vassilis agrees the $8,300 was transferred to an account in Greece. However,
he contends and bank records filed in response to a request for production show
$11,200 was transferred from Greece to the
Interstate Bank of Urbandale in September
1986. Susan makes no explanation for this
transfer.
We determine the parties have a combined net worth of approximately $12,000,
less household goods and furnishings
which Susan has in her possession. Susan
also apparently has a 1982 Oldsmobile,
jointly owned,, which she values at $4,000.
The trial court made no disposition of the
parties' assets, other than to provide for
Vassilis' payment of $11,500 as a property
settlement and a $1,200 payment toward
debt.
We modify the property award made by
the trial court to strike the provision for
Vassilis to pay a $11,500 property settlement and $1,200 toward debt. We award
Susan all household goods and furnishings
in her possession and the 1982 Oldsmobile,
as well as her checking and savings account in Iowa. The lot in Greece, Japanese
car and Greek bank accounts shall go to
Vassilis except he shall pay Susan $3,000.
He shall also pay the Visa, Discover and
Master Card debts of $2,120. Susan shall
be responsible for the Younkers and Seiferts bills of $1,146. We find such an
award to be equitable. See In re Marriage
ofByall, 353 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa App.
1984).
IV.
[8] Vassilis contends $500 a month child
support is inequitable. We agree. Vassilis
grossed $2,293.93 monthly and netted
$1,985.25. We modify to $400 per month.
Each party shall pay his or her own
attorney fees on appeal. Court costs are
taxed one-half to each party.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
(o
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